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Abstract
The Probabilistic Serial mechanism is well-known for its desirable fairness and efficiency
properties. It is one of the most prominent protocols for the random assignment problem. How-
ever, Probabilistic Serial is not incentive-compatible, thereby these desirable properties only
hold for the agents’ declared preferences, rather than their genuine preferences. A substantial
utility gain through strategic behaviors would trigger self-interested agents to manipulate the
mechanism and would subvert the very foundation of adopting the mechanism in practice. In
this paper, we characterize the extent to which an individual agent can increase its utility by
strategic manipulation. We show that the incentive ratio of the mechanism is 32 . That is, no
agent can misreport its preferences such that its utility becomes more than 1.5 times of what
it is when reports truthfully. This ratio is a worst-case guarantee by allowing an agent to have
complete information about other agents’ reports and to figure out the best response strategy
even if it is computationally intractable in general. To complement this worst-case study, we
further evaluate an agent’s utility gain on average by experiments. The experiments show that
an agent’ incentive in manipulating the rule is very limited. These results shed some light on
the robustness of Probabilistic Serial against strategic manipulation, which is one step further
than knowing that it is not incentive-compatible.
1 Introduction
Resource allocation is a fundamental and widely applicable area within AI and computer science.
The random assignment problem is central in the resource allocation area, which has wide appli-
cations in allocating workers to shifts, houses to people, dormitories to students, ramp and hangars
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to airlines, and chores to cleaning staff. In the problem, there are a set of agents and a set of items.
The agents participate in a mechanism by reporting their private preferences over the items. The
mechanism then assigns items to agents, according to a pre-defined allocation rule.
The random assignment problem, which is also known as the one-sided matching problem,
was introduced in [24] and has been studied extensively ever since. Over the years, several mecha-
nisms have been investigated, including Probabilistic Serial [2, 8, 9, 10, 20, 26], Random Priority
[1, 4, 15, 31], and Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (CEEI) [11]. In the indivisible
goods setting, the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) method is well-studied and generalized to investi-
gate various problems. In particular, Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez (1998) proposed an adaptation
of the TTC method and established an equivalence between the adapted mechanism and Random
Priority. Kesten (2009) proposed several extensions of these popular mechanisms and presented an
equivalence result between those mechanisms in terms of economic efficiency.
There are various desired properties one would like these mechanisms to fulfill, especially when
considering to deploy them in practice. In terms of efficiency, an allocation Pareto improves another
if each agent has at least the same utility in the first, and there is at least one agent where the utility
is greater than that of the second. An allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no allocation which
Pareto improves it. In terms of fairness, an allocation is envy-free if no agent prefers another agents
allocation to its own. An allocation is proportional if each of the n agents receives at least 1/n of
the resources by its own subjective valuation. Also, a mechanism is anonymous if agents with
precisely the same valuation functions must have the same probabilities of receiving each item; a
mechanism is nonbossy if an agent cannot change other agents’ allocation without changing its own
allocation. Incentive-compatibility is an important property in understanding the role that strategic
behavior can play. A mechanism is manipulable if an agent can misreport its preferences and
improve its utility. A mechanism that is not manipulable is incentive-compatible (a.k.a., truthful).
Truthfulness, in a sense, is on top of the properties mentioned above. For example, Pareto
efficiency is defined in regard to the declared preferences of the agents, rather than their genuine
preferences. Without the truthfulness property, an agent has little or strong incentive to manipulate
in a mechanism and could potentially cause significant welfare loss as well as unfairness to the
application scenarios.
As one can expect, these properties are not compatible, as shown by several impossibility re-
sults. A notable trilemma by Zhou (1990) states that there exists no mechanism that is truthful,
symmetric, and ex-ante Pareto efficient. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) shows that there does
not exist a truthful, equal treatment of equals, and ordinal efficient mechanism. Given these impos-
sibility results, one reasonable choice for implementation is the Random Priority mechanism. It is
easy to implement and incentive-compatible, but lacks efficiency, as all agents may increase their
probabilities of receiving more preferred items by implementing Probabilistic Serial. Moreover,
Probabilistic Serial is SD-envy-free. However, it is not truthful. In fact, many mechanisms, such as
CEEI, is manipulable as well. Ekici and Kesten (2016) shows that when agents are not truthful, the
outcome of Probabilistic Serial may not satisfy desirable properties related to efficiency and envy-
freeness. Hence, researchers look to develop refined analytic and experimental works to answer a
basic question: which mechanism to employ in practical applications?
There are at least two scenarios that agents may dispense with manipulation in mechanisms that
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are not incentive-compatible. One scenario is where computational complexity is considered as an
obstacle against manipulation. If manipulation is hard to compute, possibly agents will behave
sincerely. The other scenario is by characterizing the extent to which strategic manipulations can
increase utilities. If agents can increase their utility by only a small extent, given that there is an
inherent cost for them to collect necessary information from other agents in order to compute the
best response strategy, perhaps they would behave truthfully.
In this paper, we consider the second scenario in the Probabilistic Serial mechanism. We adopt
the incentive ratio notion [13] [14] to quantify agents’ incentive to deviate from reporting their
actual private information. Informally, it is the factor of the largest possible utility gain that an
agent achieves by behaving strategically, given that all other agents have their strategies fixed. Our
main result is the following theorem.
Theorem: In the Probabilistic Serial mechanism, when the number of agents is no less than the
number of items, no agent is able to unilaterally manipulate and increase its utility to more than
1.5 times of the utility when reports truthfully.
In understanding the implication of the 3/2 approximation on the manipulation incentives, we
put in mind of two technical facts. Firstly, the incentive ratio is defined in a worst-case sense.
Therefore, its bound is the strongest approximation guarantee of the manipulation incentives, in
all cases. It also means that the incentive ratio bound ignores the likelihood that extreme cases
happen. It could be the case that the probability for an agent to attain the 3/2 times utility is
negligible. Indeed, our tight bound example is rather pathological as it is constructed artificially.
Secondly, our results built upon the complete information and perfect rationality assumptions. That
is, agents have complete information about other agents’ preferences and are able to compute the
best response strategy accordingly. If either of these assumptions is missing, the agents’ power
to manipulate the mechanism would be much smaller than what the 3
2
bound implies. In fact,
computing the best response strategy is intractable in general [5]. Moreover, Hugh-Jones et al.
(2014) showed that humans do not manipulate Probabilistic Serial mechanism optimally. Joseph
Y. Halpern and Seeman (2014) provided an excellent survey of work using bounded rationality
in decision theory. Therefore, a small constant incentive ratio, in particular, 3/2 in our results,
indicate that the agents’ incentive and ability to manipulate the mechanism is reasonably bounded.
To support this statement, we further conduct some experiments. The experiments demonstrate that
the agents’ utility gain by strategic manipulation is rather limited on average, even if there are not
many agents and items.
From the technical point of view, characterizing the incentive ratio of a mechanism is chal-
lenging. As a starting point, determining the best response strategy, i.e., a report that maximizes
the agents expected utility is often intractable. In fact, this task is NP-hard in the context of the
Probabilistic Serial mechanism [5], and only local manipulation has been done experimentally by
greedy search [29]. Our proofs circumvent this obstacle by considering the three possible cases of
an agent’s utility when it truthful report its preferences. It is relatively easy to bound the incentive
ratio in two out of the three cases. Nevertheless, the other case requires a fine-grained analysis in
which several in-depth observations are critical.
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1.1 Related Work
In the presence of incentives, the random assignment problem has been extensively studied in
Computer Science and Economics over the years [18, 28, 32]. We refer the interested reader to
surveys [2, 30].
One of the focal points is how precisely agents might compute beneficial manipulations. What
if it is just too computationally difficult to compute a manipulation [6, 7]? Manipulation has been
shown to be computationally hard to compute in many voting situations, e.g., [16, 17].
For the Probabilistic Serial mechanism, Aziz et al. (2015) showed that computing the best
response (manipulation) under complete information of the other agents strategies is NP-hard for
Expected Utility maximization, a.k.a., EU-relation, but polynomial-time algorithm exists for the
Downward Lexicographic maximization, a.k.a., DL-relation. In addition, they showed that Nash
deviations under the Probabilistic Serial mechanism can cycle, but a pure Nash equilibrium is
guaranteed to exist. Unfortunately, computing a pure Nash equilibrium is intractable in general.
The empirical work by Hosseini et al. (2018) disclosed some results on the manipulability of
the Probabilistic Serial mechanism. Their experiments show that the mechanism is almost always
manipulable for various combination of agents and items, and the fraction of strongly manipulable
profiles goes to one as the ratio of items to agents increases. However, their results does not inform
to what extend these beneficial manipulations are.
An interesting work by Che and Kojima (2010) showed that Random Priority and Probabilistic
Serial mechanisms become equivalent when there exist a large number of copies of each item
type. Their results imply that, on the one hand, the inefficiency of the Random Priority mechanism
becomes small and disappears in the limit, as the economy becomes large; on the other hand, the
incentive problem of the Probabilistic Serial mechanism disappears in large economies.
The incentive ratio notion was proposed by [13] [14]. The authors investigated the buyers’
incentive to manipulate Fisher markets. They showed that no agent could gain more than twice
and 1.445 times by strategizing in Fisher markets with linear, Leontief utility functions, and Cobb-
Douglas utility functions, respectively.
2 Preliminaries
The random assignment problem consists of n agents and m divisible items oj, j ∈ [m]1. In the
Probabilistic Serial mechanism, agents express strict ordinal preferences, , over items. In other
words, they are not indifferent between any two items. As an ordinal mechanism, Probabilistic
Serial has several advantages over cardinal mechanisms that require agents to declare their actual
utilities, including simplicity and low communication complexity. The agents are endowed with
von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities over the items. We denote the utility derived by agent i on
1In general, n and m are not necessarily equal. Many works study the case that n = m, as in this case, the
allocation matrix is doubly stochastic. Thus, any probabilistic allocation can be seen as a convex combination of a set
of deterministic allocations, and equivalence between a probabilistic allocation of indivisible items and a fractional
assignment of divisible items is established. Our results hold for the case that n ≥ m, but the proofs cannot be extended
to the case n < m straightforwardly.
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obtaining a unit of item j by aij . Under standard normalization, 0 ≤ aij ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m].
Denote vector ai = (ai1, · · · , a1m).
The Probabilistic Serial rule collects agents’ preference  and output an assignment of items
to them. Denote an assignment by a matrix X = [xij]n×m, where xij indicates the probability of
agent i receiving item j,
∑
i xij = 1,∀j. So, the expected utility of agent i is ui =
∑
j aijxij .
Agents are self-interested and may misreport their ordinal preferences if that results in a better
allocation (from their perspective). In that case, ui(i,−i) < ui(′i,−i), where i is agent
i’s true preferences, −i is other agents’ preferences, and ′i is a misreport by agent i. We adopt
the incentive ratio notion to characterize the extent to which utilities can be increased by strategic
plays of individuals. The incentive ratio of agent i in mechanism M is2
rMi = max
a−i
maxa′i u
′
i(a
′
i, a−i)
ui(ai, a−i)
.
Note that the denominator is the utility of agent i when it truthfully reports its preferences, and the
numerator is the largest possible utility of agent i when it unilaterally misreports its preferences.
The incentive ratio of agent i is then the maximum value of the ratio over all possible inputs of other
agents. The incentive ratio of a mechanism M is then maxi rMi . Throughout the paper, w.l.o.g., we
consider the strategic manipulation of agent 1.
A standard approach to characterize manipulation in mechanism design (for example, voting
and market design) is to consider that the manipulating agent has complete knowledge about the
other agents’ reports. The definition of incentive ratio makes a similar assumption here. Agent 1
knows −1 and can figure out its best response strategy ′1 accordingly.
The Probabilistic Serial mechanism simulates a simultaneous eating algorithm. In the mecha-
nism, agents simultaneously “eat” their most preferred items at a uniform speed, moving onto their
next most preferred item whenever an item is fully eaten. The following example appeared in [10]
illustrates that the mechanism is not incentive-compatible.
Example: There are three agents and three items a, b, and c. The agents preferences and the
corresponding allocation are
1: b  a  c 0 3/4 1/4
2: a  b  c X = 1/2 1/4 1/4
3: a  c  b 1/2 0 1/2
If agent 1 misreports its preferences as follows, then the allocation changes accordingly.
1: a  b  c 1/3 1/2 1/6
2: a  b  c X = 1/3 1/2 1/6
3: a  c  b 1/3 0 2/3
For some utility function that is compatible with agent 1’s true preferences, for example, a1a =
0.9, a1b = 1, a1c = 0, its utilities are u1 = 0.75 in the truthful profile and u′1 = 0.8 in the
manipulation profile. The high-level intuition behind this manipulative example is that, both items
a and b are important to agent 1, but item a is more competitive as the other two agents place it as
their most preferred item; so, instead of start eating a less-competitive item b, it is better for agent
1 to start with eating item a.
2Here we replace the ordinal relations  by cardinal values aij as the notion also applies to cardinal mechanisms.
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3 Incentive Ratio Upper Bound
In this section, we prove the 3
2
incentive ratio upper bound. Our first step is a reduction, which
shows that it is sufficient to consider the instances in which agents’ utilities are dichotomous. That
is, agent 1’s preferences a1j are either close to 1, or close to 0, ∀j = 1, · · · ,m.
Lemma 1. Given any truthful profile (1,−1) and agent 1’s cardinal preference a1j’s that are
compatible with the ordering 1, denote ratio c = u
′
1
u1
, where u′1 is agent 1’s maximum utility at-
tainable by manipulation. Then one can always construct a corresponding dichotomous preference
b1j’s that are also compatible with 1, such that the ratio c is no less than before.
Proof. W.l.o.g., assume o1 1 o2 1 · · · 1 om and 1 ≥ a11 > a12 > · · · > a1m ≥ 0. Denote
lj and l′j the length of time that agent 1 spent on eating item oj in the truthful profile and the
manipulation profile, respectively. By definition,
c(a1j) =
u′1
u1
=
a11l
′
1 + a12l
′
2 + · · ·+ a1ml′m
a11l1 + a12l2 + · · ·+ a1mlm .
We will show that by carefully pushing a1j’s towards binary values 1 and 0, the ratio c is non-
decreasing. Denote
k = argmax
j
l′1 + l
′
2 + · · ·+ l′j
l1 + l2 + · · ·+ lj , cmax =
∑k
j=1 l
′
j∑k
j=1 lj
.
We can rewrite c as
c(a1j) =
∑m
j=1(a1j − a1,j+1)
∑j
h=1 l
′
h∑m
j=1(a1j − a1,j+1)
∑j
h=1 lh
, where a1,m+1 = 0.
Now we construct a new preference profile3 b1,j = 1 − (j − 1), j = 1, · · · , k and b1,j = (m −
j), j = k + 1, · · · ,m. Note that b1,j’s are compatible with 1. So, the truthful allocation lj’s
remain the same; by using the same strategy, the manipulation allocation l′j’s are also kept the
same. Moreover,
c(b1,j) =
∑m
j=1(b1,j − b1,j+1)
∑j
h=1 l
′
h∑m
j=1(b1,j − b1,j+1)
∑j
h=1 lh
=

∑
j 6=k
∑j
h=1 l
′
h + (1− (m− 2))
∑k
h=1 l
′
h

∑
j 6=k
∑j
h=1 lh + (1− (m− 2))
∑k
h=1 lh
→ cmax (→ 0)
3In this Lemma, we include the  terms for the completeness of the proof. In the rest of the paper, we omit these
terms when they are needed for expressing a strict ordinal preference, as they do not affect the characterization of the
incentive ratio bounds.
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The role of this lemma is similar to the quasi-combinatorial structure [21] and the zero-one
principle [3]. It substantiates the intuition that because the mechanism is ordinal, the worst-case
incentive ratio is encountered on extreme valuation profiles.
By Lemma 1, we can classify the items into two categories. They are, the set of items that agent
1 is interested in, i.e., O = {oj|a1j is close to 1}, and the set of items that agent 1 is not interested
in, i.e., O = {oj|a1j is close to 0}. For ease of notation, assume that agent 1 is interested in the
first k items. So, O = {o1, · · · , ok}. In the truthful profile, assume that agent 1 spends time xj on
eating item j, then its utility is u1 ≈
∑k
j=1 xj . Note that agent 1 may not be able to get a positive
fraction of each item in O, so some of these xj’s may be equal to 0. Agent 1 may also eat some of
the items in O, but their contribution to its utility is negligible.
Given agents’ ordinal preferences (no matter they are truthful or not), at any moment t, the
following lemma compares the amount of each item that is not eaten up yet in two scenarios. In
the normal scenario, all agents eat items according to their reported ordinal preferences as normal;
in the pause scenario, a set of agents is paused from time t for some time while the other agents
continue eating normally.
Lemma 2. For any item, at any moment from time t until it is eaten up, the remaining amount of
the item in the pause scenario is no less than the remaining amount in the normal scenario.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Denote tinf the earliest moment, after which there exists an
item j∗, its remaining amount in the pause scenario is less than its remaining amount in the normal
scenario. For a small enough tδ > 0, at the moment tinf + tδ, the number of agents who are eating
item j∗ in the pause scenario must be more than the number of agents who are eating item j∗ in
the normal scenario. Otherwise, the amount of j∗ cannot be smaller in the pause scenario. Denote
agent 2 one of these agents who are eating item j∗ in the pause scenario but not in the normal
scenario. Recall that every agent eats items in the order from its declared more preferred items to
less preferred items. Then agent 2’s eating status implies that there exists an item j′, which is more
preferable to item j∗ in agent 2’s report, such that at the moment tinf + tδ, item j′ is eaten up in the
pause scenario but is not eaten up yet in the normal scenario. However, it contradicts our choice of
item j∗ and the definition of tinf .
This lemma is critical as it is repetitively used in later proofs. It holds no matter how many
agents are paused and for how long they are paused. It holds for any inputs to the PS mechanism,
regardless the agents are truthful or not. With the presence of Lemma 2, we can better present the
high-level ideas of the proofs.
Denote u1 and u′1 agent 1’s utility in the truthful profile and the manipulation profile, respec-
tively. Denote T and T ′ the moment by which all items in O are eaten up in the truthful profile and
the manipulation profile, respectively. Denote T˜ and T˜ ′ the moment by which all items in O are
eaten up while agent 1 is paused all the time (or, say, agent 1 is eliminated from the eating process)
in the truthful profile and the manipulation profile, respectively.
When we ignore the  terms for maintaining a strict ordering preference, obviously, u1 = T ≤
T ′ = u′1. By Lemma 2, T
′ ≤ T˜ ′. We also note that T˜ = T˜ ′, as agent 1’s reports have no impact on
the eating process when agent 1 is eliminated. Therefore, we can prove our main result u′1 ≤ 32u1
by showing that T˜ ≤ 3
2
T . This way, we circumvent the requisition of figuring out agent 1’s best
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response strategies and only need to focus on how much more time it takes other agents to consume
the items without the presence of agent 1. This approach is used in proving Theorem 1 and Case 1
of Theorem 2.
We prove that our main theorem holds in all of the three possible cases whenm ≤ n, according
to the value of T . That is, 0 < T < 1
2
, 1
2
≤ T < 2
3
, and 2
3
≤ T ≤ 1.
Theorem 1. When 0 < T < 1
2
, the Incentive Ratio is upper bounded by 3
2
.
Proof. We will employ Lemma 2 and we are interested in a subset of O. Denote O
∗ ⊆ O the
set of items that agent 1 gets a positive fraction in the truthful profile. W.l.o.g., assume O
∗
=
{o1, · · · , ok∗}. Denote lj the length of time that agent 1 spent on eating item oj, j = 1, · · · , k∗.
That being said, item oj is eaten up at the moment
∑j
h=1 lh. Therefore, we have T =
∑k∗
j=1 lj .
Since 0 < T < 1
2
, and it takes at least time 1
2
for two agents to eat up an item, we know that at
the moment
∑j
h=1 lh, there are at least three agents eating item oj, j = 1, · · · , k∗. So, apart from
agent 1, there are at least two other agents eating each of these items oj at the moment they are
eaten up.
Now let us consider the following process in which agent 1 is eliminated. From the start to l1,
all agents eat items according to their preferences. At time l1, pause all other agents but the agents
who are eating item o1. Since agent 1 is eliminated, it will take them some extra time δ1 to eat up
item o1. Agent 1 is absent for l1 time so far and there are at least two of these agents, so δ1 ≤ l12 . At
the moment l1 + δ1, resume all agents’ eating procedure, and pause all agents but the agents who
are eating item o2 at the moment l1+ δ1+ l2. For the same reason, it will take these agents an extra
δ2 ≤ l22 time to eat up the fraction due to agent 1’s absence. Repeating this process until all items
in O
∗
are eaten up; at this moment all items in O/O
∗
are eaten up as well. Therefor, we have that
T˜ ≤∑k∗j=1(lj + δj) ≤∑k∗j=1(lj + lj2 ) ≤ 32T.
The second case is the most challenging one. It requires a fine-grained analysis.
Theorem 2. When 1
2
≤ T < 2
3
, the Incentive Ratio is upper bounded by 3/2.
In this case, for every item oj ∈ O∗, if at least two other agents are eating the item with agent 1
at the moment
∑j
h=1 lh, then the theorem can be proved in the same way as Theorem 1. Therefore,
assume that there exists an item that only one other agent is eating it with agent 1 at the moment it
is eaten up. Note that there could only exist one such item, as it takes at least time 1
2
for two agents
to eat up one item. Denote this item by ok′ and the other agent by agent 2. For ease of notation, let
t1 = l1 + · · ·+ lk′−1, t2 = lk′ , and t3 = lk′+1 + · · ·+ lk∗ . Then t1 + t2 + t3 = T .
Lemma 3. t1 + t2 ≥ 12 , t3 < 16 , t1 < 13 , and t2 > 2t3.
Proof. Since only agents 1 and 2 are eating item ok′ , it must take at least time 12 for them to eat it
up. So t1 + t2 ≥ 12 . In addition, T < 23 , so t3 = T − (t1 + t2) < 16 . On the one hand, agent 1 has
been eating item ok′ for time t2, and agent 2, even if it start eating item ok′ from the beginning, has
been eating it for time t1+ t2, we know that t2+(t1+ t2) ≥ 1; on the other hand, t1+ t2 ≤ T < 23 ,
we conclude that t2 > 13 and t1 <
1
3
. Therefore, we have t2 > 13 ≥ 2t3.
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Denote O1 the set of items that are eaten up on or before time t1 in the truthful profile, O2 the
set of items that are eaten up in time interval (t1, t1 + t2] in the truthful profile, and O3 the set of
items that are eaten up in time interval (t1 + t2, T ] in the truthful profile. Note that these three sets
contain all items that agent 1 is interested in, i.e., O ⊆ O1 ∪O2 ∪O3.
Since t1 < 13 , in time interval [0, t1], there are at least three agents eating any item that agent 1
was eating, so the analysis for this interval is similar to that in Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. If we eliminate agent 1, all items in O1 would be eaten up within time 32t1.
For the set O3, we would not obtain the same 32 bound straightforwardly, but are able to obtain
a slightly looser bound, which will be used together with some other approaches for handling O2
to obtain an overall 3
2
bound. We first show the following lemma.
Lemma 4. In the normal scenario, for each item in O3, at the moment that it is finished, there are
at least two agents other than agents 1 and 2 who are eating the item.
Proof. For each item oj ∈ O3, we prove the lemma in three possible cases.
• At the moment t1 + t2, no agent is eating item oj . In this case, because t3 < 16 and the item
oj is eaten up within the interval [t1+ t2, t1+ t2+ t3], there must be at least six agents eating
the item. Amongst these six agents, even if two of them are agents 1 and 2, there are another
four agents.
• At the moment t1 + t2, only one agent is eating item oj . In this case, even if this agent eats
item oj from the start, there are at least 1 − (t1 + t2) fraction of this item remaining, and it
will be eaten up before the moment t1+ t2+ t3, by
1−(t1+t2)
t3
= 1+ 1−t
t3
> 1+ 1−2/3
1/6
= 3, we
know that there are at least four agents eating the item. Two of them might be agents 1 and
2. Even though, there are at least another two agents.
• At the moment t1+ t2, at least two agents are eating item oj . Since agents 1 and 2 are eating
item ok′ , these must be two other agents.
If two agents were absent for some time, it will take another two agents the same amount of
time to eat up the amount of items left over due to their absence. Therefore, a direct consequence
of the above lemma is the following bound.
Corollary 2. After eliminating agent 1 from eating items inO1, if we eliminate agents 1 and 2 from
the moment 3
2
t1 + t2, all items in O3 will be eaten up by at most an extra t3 time.
We now turn to prove Theorem 2 by combining these intermediate results and an analysis on
item ok′ and the set O3. According to the high-level idea of our proofs described before, we will
eliminate agent 1 from eating item ok′ . This will delay the moment that item ok′ is eaten up. More
importantly, it will lead to two possible consequences.
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Proof of Theorem 2:
Case 1: The process of eating item ok′ is extended, so some agents who eat items in O3 will not
continue eating their next item in O3 and will take the chance to eat item ok′ before the moment
3
2
t1 + t2 + 2t3.
In the truthful profile, denote {s1, · · · , sj} ⊆ O3 the set of items that either agent 1 or agent 2
gets a positive fraction. For h = 1, · · · , j, denote ch and dh the fraction of item sh that agents 1
and 2 get, respectively.
In the manipulation profile (agent 1 is eliminated, agent 2 is eating item ok′), denote zh the
moment at which item sh is eaten up; denote agent 3 the first agent who comes to eat item ok′
before the moment 3
2
t1 + t2 + 2t3. In case there are multiple agents come to agent item ok′ at the
same time, pick one of them as agent 3 randomly. Denote 3
2
t1 + t2 + x the moment agent 3 starts
to eat item ok′ , where 0 ≤ x ≤ 2t3.
Assume 1.5t1 + t2 + x ∈ (zw−1, zw], w ≤ j. At the moment 32t1 + t2 + x, compare the truthful
profile and the manipulation profile, due to the absence of agent 1, item ok′ is not eaten up in time.
So both agents 1 and 2 have not started eating items in O3 at time 32t1 + t2. So there is a delay of
1
2
t1 +
∑w−1
j=1 cj+
∑w−1
j=1 dj
2
. The 1
2
in the second term is due to Lemma 4.
Now let agents 2 and 3 eat item ok′ and pause all other agents until the item is eaten up. This
will take agents 2 and 3 time t2−x
2
, here t2 is due to the absence of agent 1, x is how much agent 2
has eaten, the denominator 2 is due to Lemma 4.
Now at time 3t1
2
+ t2 + x +
t2−x
2
, resume all agents except agent 1. We calculate the amount
of time after this moment when the items in O3 will be eaten up in the manipulation profile. It
consists of three categories. In the manipulation profile, when we pause the all other agents but the
agents who are eating item in O ∩ O3, this moment belongs to the first category. The time in the
first category is at most
∑j
h=w dh
2
. Note that t3 =
∑j
h=1 dh, the time in the first category is at most
t3 −
∑w−1
h=1 dh
2
.
The second category is associated with agent 2. At time 3t1
2
+t2+x+
t2−x
2
, agent 2 will begin to
eat an item denoted by oq. Then in the truthful profile, at the moment t1+ t2+x−
∑w−1
j=1 cj+
∑w−1
j=1 dj
2
agent 2 is eating item oq. If oq /∈ O3, it implies oq will not be eaten up at moment t1+ t2+ t3 in the
truthful profile. Agent 2 will not affect the moment items in O3 been eaten up in the manipulation
profile anymore. The second category would be empty. If oq ∈ O3, in the manipulation profile, we
would pause all other agents but the agents who are eating item oq. This pause moment belongs to
the second category. In the manipulation profile, before the moment 1.5t1 + t2 + x, the total time
agent 2 has been absent for eating item in O3 is x −
∑w−1
h=1 (ch+dh)
2
. These items are o1, ..., ow1 and
oq. The length of time agent 2 has been absent for eating item oq is x − 3
∑w−1
h=1 ch+
∑w−1
h=1 dh
2
. In the
pause period, it will take agents who are eating oq at most
x
2
− 3
∑w−1
h=1 ch +
∑w−1
h=1 dh
4
time, which is the upper bound of the time in the second category.
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The other moments before O3 have been eaten up belongs to third category. In this category,
manipulation profile is identical to the truthful profile except agent 1 is not eating. The time in this
category would be
t3 − (x−
∑w−1
j=1 cj +
∑w−1
j=1 dj
2
).
Considering all three categories, we upper bound the time when all items in O1 ∪ O2 ∪ O3 are
eaten up as follows
T˜ ≤ [3t1
2
+ t2 + x+
t2 − x
2
] + [
t3 −
∑w−1
h=1 dh
2
]
+[
x
2
− 3
∑w−1
h=1 ch
4
−
∑w−1
h=1 dh
4
]
+[t3 − x+ c1 + ...+ cw−1 + d1 + ...+ dw−1
2
]
= 1.5t1 + 1.5t2 + 1.5t3 −
∑w−1
h=1 (ch + dh)
4
≤ 1.5(t1 + t2 + t3)
Case 2: Before time 1.5t1 + t2 + 2t3, the agents who eat items in O3 will continue eating their
next items in O3 as they are more favorable than ok′ . In this case, we are not going to use the
high-level idea presented before to show T˜ ≤ 3
2
T . Instead, we will characterize an upper bound of
agent 1’s utility when it uses the best response strategy. This upper bound will be partitioned into
two quantities; one of which will be bounded using Lemma 2.
By using the best response strategy,
u′1 = u
′
1|≤ 3
2
t1+t2+2t3
+ u′1|> 3
2
t1+t2+2t3
,
where u′1|≤ 3
2
t1+t2+2t3
and u′1|> 3
2
t1+t2+2t3
denote agent 1’s utility gained before and after the moment
3
2
t1+ t2+2t3, respectively. Obviously, u′1|≤ 3
2
t1+t2+2t3
≤ 3
2
t1+ t2+2t3, where the equality holds if
agent 1 eats items in O from the start to time 3
2
t1 + t2 + 2t3. Next, we upper bound u′1|> 3
2
t1+t2+2t3
.
In fact, the moment 3
2
t1 + t2 + 2t3 is calibrated as it is the time needed to eat up items in O1
and O3, plus agent 2 has been eating item ok′ alone for t2 time, when agent 1 is eliminated. Now
let us check out the items that would have been left over in the manipulation profile at the moment
3
2
t1+ t2+2t3. By Lemma 2, we notice that the only item in O would possibly be still not eaten up
yet, is ok′ . Due to the absence of agent 1, it has t2 left, but agent 2 has been eaten it for an additional
2t3 time, so there would be t2 − 2t3 of item ok′ left.
If ok′ is not eaten up yet, agent 2 must be eating it at the moment 1.5t1+ t2+2t3. To gain more
utility, the optimal strategy for agent 1 is to eat item ok′ after this moment. Agent 1 can get at most
t2−2t3
2
fraction for the existence of agent 2. Therefore,
u′1 = u
′
1|≤ 3
2
t1+t2+2t3
+ u′1|> 3
2
t1+t2+2t3
≤ 3
2
t1 + t2 + 2t3 +
t2 − 2t3
2
11
=
3
2
t1 +
3
2
t2 + t3 ≤ 3
2
T.
At last, we have the third case.
Theorem 3. When 2
3
≤ T ≤ 1, the Incentive Ratio is upper bounded by 3
2
.
This is trivial, since the optimal utility u′1 is upper bound by
m
n
≤ 1. Hence the utility achieved
in truthful profile is quite large compared to u′1. Formally, r
PS = max
u′1
u1
≤ 12
3
≤ 3
2
.
Combining Theorems 1, 2, 3, we complete the proof of our main Theorem.
4 The Tight Bound Example
In this section, we show that the upper bound 3
2
is tight. The following instance and the manipula-
tion provide us a tight lower bound example of the incentive ratio.
In the instance, the n agents’ preferences are
1: o1  o2  · · ·  on−1  on
2: o1  o2  · · ·  on−1  on
i: o2  o3  · · ·  on  o1 i = 3, · · · , n
Agent 1 is interested in the first n
2
− 1 items, i.e., O = {o1, · · · , on
2
−1}. Then in the truthful
profile, u1 = 12 . Agent 1 will only get half fraction of item 1.
By using the strategy o2  o3  · · ·  on
2
−1  o1  on
2
 · · ·  on. Agent 1 will get 1n−1
fraction of item 2 to n
2
− 1 and 1
4
fraction of item 1. Agent 1’s utility becomes u′1 =
3
4
. So the ratio
is 3
2
.
5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we present numerical experiments on the extent to which an agent can increase its
utility by unilateral manipulation in the Probabilistic Serial mechanism. While we investigated the
theoretical incentive bounds of the mechanism in the worst-case framework, the purpose of this
section is to evaluate its performance in an average-case framework.
We set up our experiments as follows. We set n = m, i.e., the number of agents is equal to the
number of items. We vary this number from 8 to 20. For each value of n, we generate 10000 of these
instances. We construct an instance by uniformly at random and independently generating each
agent’s ordinal preferences. We make the manipulator’s cardinal preferences dichotomous. This
is because of Lemma 1 – it always generates a larger utility gain comparing to the corresponding
non-dichotomous preferences. We vary the number of items the manipulator is interested in, say
k, from 2 to 6. For each of these instances, we enumerate the manipulator’s all k! strategies, in
order to figure out the largest possible utility the agent can obtain. By dividing the largest utility
attainable of its utility obtained in the truthful profile, we get a ratio to evaluate the agent’s utility
increment.
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Our experimental results are presented in Figure 1. We can observe that the ratio is between
1.02 and 1.06, which is much smaller than the worst-case incentive ratio bound of 1.5. In particular,
for instances with a fixed number of agents/items, the expected ratio is decreasing in the number
of items that the manipulator is interested. For instances with a fixed number of items that the
manipulator is interested, the expected ratio is increasing in the number of agents/items.
Figure 1: Experimental Evaluation
6 Conclusion
By knowing that the Probabilistic Serial mechanism is not incentive-compatible, in this paper, we
examined the degree of an agent’s incentive to manipulate the mechanism. In the form of incentive
ratio, we showed that no agent is able to increase its utility by a 50% through strategic behaviors.
This ratio is the strongest guarantee in the worst-case sense, by allowing that the agent has com-
plete information about other agents’ private information and is perfectly rational. In addition, we
conduct experiments to examine the manipulation incentive in an average-case sense. The evalua-
tion demonstrated that the utility-incremental ratio is much smaller than the theoretical incentive
ratio bound. The evaluation bears out the supposition that Probabilistic Serial is approximately
incentive-compatible in practice, even for small size instances. We hope that this work offered a
better understanding of the robustness of the PS mechanisms against manipulations, which is one
step beyond knowing that the mechanism could be manipulated. Perhaps the next step could be a
formal analytical characterization of the average-case incentive ratio.
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